"Smartness" without vision: the Moroccan regime in the face of acquiescent elites and weak social mobilization by Zerhouni, Saloua
www.ssoar.info
"Smartness" without vision: the Moroccan regime
in the face of acquiescent elites and weak social
mobilization
Zerhouni, Saloua
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Zerhouni, S. (2014). "Smartness" without vision: the Moroccan regime in the face of acquiescent elites and weak
social mobilization. (SWP Comment, 11/2014). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-391793
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  From June to August 2013, Dr. Saloua Zerhouni was a fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 11 
 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in framework of February 2014 
 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program 





German Institute  
for International and 













“Smartness” Without Vision 
The Moroccan Regime in the Face of Acquiescent Elites and Weak Social Mobilization 
Saloua Zerhouni 
In contrast to other North African and Middle Eastern rulers, the Moroccan monar-
chy has been able to maintain and stabilize its reign in the face of popular protest. 
In response to demonstrations by the 20 February Movement (M20) in early 2011, King 
Mohammed VI announced the reform of the constitution and the establishment of a 
parliamentary monarchy. In addition, the regime has successfully bought off opposi-
tion by appropriating the main reform demands and by bringing in figures from the 
former opposition Justice and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développe-
ment, PJD) to lead the government. But although the regime was able to absorb social 
unrest and to pull the rug from underneath the M20, protests and discontent have 
continued in Morocco, as major issues such as fighting corruption, establishing social 
justice and dealing with youth unemployment have not been addressed. Thus, although 
the moves of the monarchy have earned it the label of being “politically smart” and 
Morocco being “exceptional,” the country is far from immune to the unrest that has 
rocked neighboring countries. Europeans should therefore support a peaceful path 
of more substantial reforms to avoid regression and potentially violent escalations. 
 
Recent developments in Morocco show 
that reforms remain more at the level of 
discourse than reality. There are major dis-
parities and contradictions between what 
the regime claims with regards to democra-
tization and respect of human rights and 
the actual practices of political control and 
silencing dissident voices. Two cases con-
firm this trend: The first one was the arrest 
in September 2013 of Ali Anouzla – who 
has since been released on bail – one of the 
most popular independent journalists and 
editor of the Arabic version of the online 
newspaper Lakome. Anouzla was charged for 
“inciting terrorism” after posting on his 
website an indirect link to a video titled 
“Morocco: Kingdom of Corruption and 
Despotism,” which was released by al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb and posted first on 
the website of Spain’s leading daily news-
paper El Pais. The detention of Anouzla was 
clearly meant to silence him following a 
series of articles he had written that were 
critical of the monarchy, and more specifi-
cally the King. The second example con-
stitutes a breach of the spirit – rather than 
the letter – of the 2011 constitution: The 
October 2013 cabinet reshuffle witnessed a 
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major increase in the number of “techno-
crats” loyal to the Palace who were appoint-
ed to strategic portfolios such as the Minis-




The idea of gradualism has been part of 
the Moroccan political discourse for many 
decades. But the reform process has been 
open-ended, broad and has not had well-
defined objectives. Thus, there have often 
been contradictions between the proclaimed 
vision and the actual implementation of 
reforms. Regardless of the shortcomings of 
the reforms, they do serve a political goal, 
namely to keep both the political elites and 
the social forces busy with these reforms 
rather than guaranteeing their implemen-
tation into practice. In addition, the reform 
process is meant to reinforce the image of a 
modernizing monarchy at the international 
and regional levels. At the national level, it 
helps the monarchy to portray itself as the 
sole credible and efficient institution that 
is able to trigger and implement reform in 
the country. 
The M20 and the monarchy’s reactions 
In spite of Morocco’s alleged exceptional-
ism with regards to the wave of protests 
in the region, in 2011 a group of online 
activists led the calls for nationwide pro-
tests in favor of major political changes 
and to organize the 20 February Movement. 
The first demonstrations were massive and 
mobilized some 200,000 citizens in 53 cities 
across the country in early 2011. The move-
ment was originally composed of a mixed 
group of opposition forces with different 
ideological backgrounds, ranging from left 
and radical left-wing political parties to 
Islamist movements. The most active and 
involved among them were the Islamist 
movement al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and 
Charity), the United Socialist Union and the 
Moroccan Association of Human Rights 
(AMDH). Unlike protest movements in other 
Arab states, M20 has maintained its call for 
“reform” rather than for the “overthrow” 
of the regime and has not questioned the 
monarchy as such. The movement has asked 
for a democratic constitution, the indepen-
dence of the judiciary and the media, as 
well as the separation of wealth and politi-
cal power to leave the politics of a rentier 
economy and the monopolization of re-
sources behind. 
In reaction to the M20’s demands, the 
monarchy adopted a series of reforms in 
the political, social and economic fields – 
prominently announced in the King’s speech 
on March 9, 2011, in which he promised 
constitutional reform and professed his 
willingness to relinquish parts of his pow-
ers. Accordingly, the King appointed a royal 
committee to be in charge of drafting a new 
constitution. It was adopted by referendum 
in July 2011 and promoted by the official 
media as providing for a democratic sys-
tem. It was also supported by major polit-
ical parties, which have developed an 
alliance with the Palace based on common 
interests over the years. 
In the new constitution, human rights 
and political freedoms have been expanded. 
Amazigh, the language of the country’s 
Berber-speaking population, has been recog-
nized as an official language. The legislative 
and oversight powers of Parliament have 
been broadened and the competencies of 
the government enhanced. The judiciary 
has been granted more independence. A 
Higher Judicial Council has been estab-
lished and its prerogatives have been ex-
tended to include missions of investigation. 
Another novelty of the text is the constitu-
tionalization of existing regulatory bodies 
that aim at implementing principles of 
good governance, transparency and equali-
ty, such as the Competition Council, cre-
ated in 2009, or the establishment of new 
ones, such as the Authority in Charge of 
Parity and Fighting All Forms of Discrimi-
nation. (For more details on the constitu-
tional reform, see SWP Comments 30/2012 
by Amin Alsaden, http://bit.ly/SWP12C30.) 
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The reforms certainly brought improve-
ments in certain areas, in particular with 
regards to enshrining human rights. Yet, 
the constitutional reform did not establish 
the proclaimed parliamentary monarchy 
but rather maintained the “executive mon-
archy,” in which the King retains signifi-
cant powers over strategic issues, such as 
matters related to religion and security. The 
King can still dissolve Parliament and dis-
miss ministers, and he chairs the Council 
of Ministers when strategic issues are dis-
cussed. He is the head of the Supreme Judi-
cial Council and the newly created National 
Security Council, and he remains the su-
preme arbiter among political actors. 
In parallel to the constitutional reform, 
other measures were adopted. Early legis-
lative elections were held in November 
2011. A few weeks later, a coalition govern-
ment led by the Islamist PJD, which had 
received a plurality of votes, was formed. 
However, with a decrease in societal pres-
sures following the adoption of the new 
constitution, the regime put the reform 
process on hold. The elections for the Upper 
House of Parliament, which were to take 
place in the fall of October 2012 at the 
latest, have not been organized as of yet. 
Whether the reason behind this delay is the 
regime’s fear of another success of the PJD 
at the local and regional levels, concerns 
over a potentially low voter turnout or the 
official argument given that the Moroccan 
“model of regionalization” has not been 
completed yet, the deferral shows that there 
is not enough will on the part of the mon-
archy and political parties to translate some 
of the provisions of the new constitution 
into reality. The same goes for the adoption 
of 20 “organic laws,” that is, laws that 
define the procedures to establish regulatory 
bodies and some of the new institutions, as 
stipulated in the constitution. So far, only 
four organic laws have been adopted. The 
slow pace in the adoption of organic laws 
shows that there is no urgency in establish-
ing transparency and accountability. 
Government’s reform initiatives 
The PJD-led government has launched im-
portant reform initiatives, such as a dia-
logue on the reform of the judiciary system. 
It has also introduced measures aimed at 
fighting corruption and establishing pro-
fessional conduct in the public service, and 
it has made the reform of a costly system of 
subsidies one of its priorities. However, the 
government – and more specifically the PJD 
– does not have the clout to put pressure on 
the monarchical institution to implement 
these reforms. 
In fact, over the past two years, the PJD 
has supported most of the King’s moves 
for the purpose of normalizing its presence 
within the formal political sphere and 
building trust with the monarchy. This in 
itself constrains the performance of the 
new government and its capacity to tackle 
reform issues directly. In this regard, the 
PJD’s attempts at fighting corruption are 
a significant example. Corruption is wide-
spread in the country, where wealth and 
political power are highly concentrated and 
the political system functions based on 
what analysts have described as “endemic 
corruption,” that is, different forms of 
material benefits that are granted to both 
the political and the military elites. In this 
system, the monarchy’s business interests 
are widespread in different sectors that 
range from food distribution and cement 
production to phosphate mining and the 
services sector. The government has little 
power to address the endemic corruption 
in the political regime. Sending high-
ranking officials involved in corruption to 
prison, such as Khalid Alioua, the former 
head of Real Estate and Hotel Loans (Crédit 
Immobilier and Hôtelier – CIH), for exam-
ple, is more of a symbolic act than a reform 
measure. In addition, Alioua was released 
in March 2013 without being sentenced. 
The current government also has little 
substantive political authority to tackle 
other structural reform issues. In July 2013, 
it was confronted with a crisis after one of 
the coalition parties close to the Palace, the 
Istiqlal Party, withdrew its ministers from 
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the government. Although the reasons 
behind the governmental crisis remain 
unclear, it shows that the head of govern-
ment, Abdelilah Benkirane, is at the mercy 
of other coalition partners who can be in-
strumentalized by the regime as part of its 
strategy to undermine the PJD. Keeping the 
head of government busy with such a crisis 
– instead of allowing him to focus his ener-
gies on pushing forward the reform process 
– might also be part of a regime strategy 
to curb the PJD’s performance and its capac-
ity to respond to the high expectations of 
the Moroccans. (For more details on the 
PJD-led government and its relations with 
the Palace, see SWP Comments 6/2014 by 
Mohammed Masbah, http://bit.ly/SWP14C06.) 
Acquiescent political elites 
The reforms over the last two years have 
been accompanied by changes in the com-
position of political elites. These changes 
have mostly amounted to a rotation of 
influential figures within the core elite 
around the King. Thus, while the govern-
ment and Parliament have indeed seen a 
renewal in personnel, there are no signs 
of significant changes in the relationship 
between the monarchy and the political 
elites: The renewal of the latter has not 
gone hand in hand with the elites changing 
their attitudes vis-à-vis the central power 
and political practices. Rather, recent devel-
opments in Morocco have shown that elite 
rotation and renewal serve mainly to main-
tain the monarchy’s dominance and con-
tinuity, and that there is a persistent pat-
tern of acquiescence by the elites. 
Indeed, a significant number of the 
political elites have been blind supporters 
of all initiatives stemming from the monar-
chical institution. This can be explained by 
the clientelist networks that the monarchy 
has created over the years, in which eco-
nomic self-interest has become one of the 
elites’ shared values, thus providing the 
regime with a reservoir of loyalists. These 
loyal elites are to be found among so-called 
technocrats close to the Palace, but also 
among the business elites, high-level offi-
cials in local administration, the army, the 
religious establishment and mainstream 
political parties. More recently, leading 
civil society actors, former leftist opposi-
tionists, and intellectuals have been drawn 
into these networks. They constitute a new 
pool for cooptation by – and legitimization 
of – the regime. 
The royal cabinet’s new configuration 
During 2011, the monarch doubled the 
number of his advisors from six to twelve. 
The royal cabinet was reinforced first 
through the appointments of Abdellatif 
Menouni, El Mustapha Sahel and Omar 
Aziman. All of them have extensive experi-
ence in serving the regime and are known 
for their expertise, rigor, credibility and 
loyalty to the Makhzan, that is, the monar-
chy and the central state apparatus. Then, 
as the head of government was forming his 
cabinet, the King simultaneously appointed 
three new advisors. The most surprising – 
and contested – appointment was that of 
Fouad Ali El-Himma, a classmate of the 
King, former Minister of Interior and the 
Palace’s man for political and security 
issues. 
El-Himma had been criticized by differ-
ent opposition parties, be it the PJD or the 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), for 
his interference with and manipulation of 
the political party scene through the estab-
lishment of the Party for Authenticity and 
Modernity (PAM) in August 2008. The M20 
had asked for El-Himma’s resignation 
and withdrawal from the political sphere 
because he was widely perceived as a sym-
bol of political corruption. El-Himma’s 
appointment thus was a clear signal that 
the monarchy was not willing to let the 
people decide or influence who should 
be included in or excluded from the close 
circles of decision-making. 
Most of the newcomers to the royal 
cabinet, all highly educated, have been in 
charge of strategic files – with the extra-
constitutional royal cabinet serving as a 
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“shadow government.” Indeed, there is 
no legal framework that determines the 
functions, missions and the relationship of 
the royal cabinet vis-à-vis other state insti-
tutions. Very often, the King’s advisors 
intervene directly in issues that fall under 
the domain of the government and for 
which they cannot be held accountable. 
The lack of clarity regarding the roles and 
competencies of the royal cabinet and the 
government poses serious problems in 
terms of accountability. 
This has become particularly evident in 
what has been referred to as “Daniel Gate.” 
Due to massive popular outrage, the King 
in August 2013 revoked his decision to 
grant amnesty to Daniel Galván Viña, a 
Spanish pedophile convicted by a Moroccan 
court of raping 11 children. The Palace said 
in a communiqué that “the King was never 
informed, in any way or at any time, of the 
seriousness of the abject crimes of which 
the person concerned was convicted.” The 
PJD Minister of Justice, Mustapha Ramid, 
had, however, declared earlier that the 
Palace had indeed been informed and that 
the decision of pardon was motivated by 
“national interests” and “friendly relations” 
with Spain. An investigative report pub-
lished by the independent news website 
Lakome mentioned the involvement of the 
King’s advisor El-Himma in drawing up 
the list of the 48 Spanish prisoners who 
were granted pardon, among them Daniel 
Galván. Although the constitution grants 
the King the right to pardon prisoners on 
specific occasions, preparing the lists is the 
responsibility of the government. This is 
but one example of ill-defined competen-
cies creating ambiguities that are not con-
ducive for good governance, but rather 
provide the monarchy with a sphere for 
manipulation, allowing it to escape ac-
countability. 
The PJD-led government 
The preeminence of the monarchy and the 
prevention of most of the initiatives under-
taken by PJD ministers have been apparent 
since the early phases of government for-
mation. When asked by the King in Novem-
ber 2011 to form the cabinet, Benkirane, 
as the leader of the party that had won a 
plurality of seats, had no choice but to put 
aside ideological differences and join forces 
with other political parties, both from secu-
lar-socialist and centrist-royalist orienta-
tions. Among the thirty ministers and depu-
ty ministers, eleven portfolios went to the 
PJD, six to the Istiqlal Party, three to the 
Popular Movement, two to the Constitu-
tional Union and two to the Party of Pro-
gress and Socialism. Although the majority 
of ministers have a political affiliation, 
there are also six “technocrats” close to the 
Makhzan. The latter were appointed to stra-
tegic portfolios such as religious affairs, 
national defense and the general secretariat 
of the government, that is, the department 
in charge of drafting most of the laws. 
With the October 2013 government 
reshuffle, after Istiqlal had left and the 
National Rally of Independents joined the 
coalition, the number of ministerial port-
folios increased from 30 to 38. Major 
changes included an increase in the num-
ber of female ministers (from one to six) 
and of “technocrats” appointed to strategi-
cally important departments, such as the 
interior and national education, thus bring-
ing in new faces and, at the same time, 
allowing the regime to maintain control 
over strategic ministries. 
The PJD’s margin for maneuver has thus 
remained very limited. The party has opted 
for a non-confrontational approach, and its 
leader has tended to be compliant vis-à-vis 
the monarch. Whatever the motives behind 
the PJD’s behavior – pragmatic or tactical – 
it is likely to turn out to be a risky busi-
ness. Recent experiences have shown that 
the participation of opposition forces in the 
established institutional framework has 
contributed toward their being discredited 
vis-à-vis their social basis. For example, this 
was the case with the USFP in 1997, when, 
while leading the government, the socialist 
party allowed for a smooth transition of 
power between the two monarchs, Hassan 
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II (1961–1999) and Mohamed VI (1999–pres-
ent), rather than push for a democratic 
opening. 
The political practices, norms, symbolic 
rituals and general submissiveness of the 
elites have remained largely the same. Yet, 
in August 2013, a young Member of Parlia-
ment, Adil Tchikitou, from the conservative 
Istiqlal Party, refused to take part in the 
annual ceremony of allegiance because he 
objected to the practice of bowing to the 
King, which, in his words, “reflects a slave-
master relationship.” During the ceremony 
of allegiance, all representatives of state 
institutions, elected bodies and tribes bow 
to the King and – apart from some leading 
human rights organizations such as the 
AMDH or the M20 – the majority of the 
political elites do not question or criticize 
this practice. Thus, Tchikitou’s act has been 
an exception to the rule. 
Weakened mobilization 
The reaction of the Moroccan regime to 
the demands of the M20 vacillated between 
the adoption of reforms, attempts at co-
optation, intimidation and repression. The 
regime has allowed peaceful demonstra-
tions to take place, but it has occasionally 
used violence to repress protests in cities 
such as Rabat, Casablanca, Tangiers, Agadir 
and Safi. For instance, a sit-in organized on 
May 15, 2011, in front of the clandestine 
Temara detention center was violently 
repressed. Activists such as Kamal El Omari 
from the city of Safi died in May 2011 as a 
result of injuries inflicted by the police. 
In addition, the official media covered the 
activities of the M20 in a biased way, and 
activists were very often represented as a 
source of instability. Some of the leading 
figures of the M20, such as Oussama El 
Khlifi, have been – successfully – invited 
to join the regime party, PAM. All these 
strategies combined have contributed to 
the weakening of the movement and of 
its capacity to mobilize around its main 
demands. Also, many Moroccans have been 
willing to wait and see what the reforms 
would bring rather than continue to pro-
test. They have also had an eye on social 
upheavals in the region. With the instabil-
ity and violence that have characterized 
countries such as Egypt and Syria, many 
Moroccans have been reluctant to mobilize 
for regime change. 
Organizational shortcomings and the 
lack of a unifying issue to mobilize Moroc-
cans were also factors in diminishing 
the influence of the M20. During the first 
months of the movement, internal divi-
sions between secular activists as well as 
the growing and visible presence of mem-
bers of the anti-regime Islamists of al-Adl 
wa-l-Ihsan affected its capacity to build con-
sensus and to mobilize. But when al-Adl 
wa-l-Ihsan suspended its support to the M20 
in December 2011, that led to a decreasing 
number of protestors in the streets. More 
importantly, during the protests, actors 
from civil society organizations, Islamists, 
youth movements and professional groups 
expressed mainly narrow sectoral demands 
and had divergent expectations of the state. 
For instance, university professors, medical 
nurses and Imams all demanded that the 
state increase their salaries and/or improve 
their working conditions, but they organ-
ized their demonstrations and sit-ins sepa-
rately and in parallel to those organized by 
the M20. This prevented them from “con-
necting the dots” and unifying around par-
ticular reform issues. The groups lacked the 
solidarity necessary for exerting real pres-
sure for change. Thus, rather than being 
confronted by a unified movement pushing 
for substantial change, the regime was 
faced by a heterogeneous conglomerate of 
loosely connected actors pursuing partial 
demands, and therefore it was able to deal 
with – and either pacify or repress – one at 
a time. 
Still, although the regime has been suc-
cessful in weakening the M20, Morocco has 
witnessed continual protests over the past 
two years. Moroccans continue to organize 
sit-ins, demonstrations and to sign petitions 
to express their disenchantment with state 
policies when their political, social and eco-
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nomic rights are at stake. Morocco is con-
fronted with many of the problems that 
have led to revolts and instability in other 
countries of the region. The country has a 
high rate of youth unemployment (30% of 
Morocco’s urban youth are unemployed); 
problems stemming from corruption at 
all levels; largely discredited political insti-
tutions, as different surveys have demon-
strated; and an image crisis at the level of 
the political parties, which is linked, among 
other factors, to the lack of internal democ-
racy. 
Without addressing these deficits, the 
monarchical regime might be challenged 
by social groups that are less peaceful 
than the demonstrators who are currently 
calling for a real constitutional monarchy. 
The mobilization of thousands of Moroc-
cans in August 2013 against the King’s 
amnesty for Daniel Galván shows that the 
eruption of social unrest can be surprising 
and unforeseeable – as was the case in 
Tunisia in 2010 in reaction to Mohamed 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation. It also shows 
the willingness of people to contest even 
the decisions made by the monarch when 
they feel that their dignity has been 
trampled on. 
Moreover, although the regime domi-
nates the political process and has been 
able to domesticate most of its political 
elites – apart from opposition forces such 
as al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan and some leftist politi-
cal parties – it has little control over chang-
ing attitudes among the people and their 
behavior. Two factors play a role here. First-
ly, alternative social media have been chal-
lenging the official views in a variety of 
ways. In this new public sphere, more and 
more Moroccans have been engaging in 
counter-discourses to the top-down reform 
process. Secondly, the overall trend of 
decreasing participation in legislative and 
local elections between 1993 and 2007 is an 
indicator of a rising political awareness as 
well as of changing attitudes vis-à-vis the 
state. In 2011, only 45 percent of registered 
voters went to the polls, whereas in 1993 
the turnout was some 63 percent. 
Loosely organized social movements 
will remain an important driving force 
for change and a major challenge to the 
regime. For instance, M20 activists have 
already started to organize differently and 
mobilize against different issues, such as 
sexual harassment. They have raised civic 
and political awareness among the people 
by producing videos and posting them on 
the net. In addition, new initiatives such 
as “Une heure de lecture,” which consists of 
inviting young people to gather in a public 
space, read an article or parts of a book 
and then debate them, have started to take 
place. These new forms of engaging in the 
public sphere are, in fact, a nuisance to 
the regime. In November 2013, the police 
stopped young people from gathering and 
reading in Casablanca. Despite the regime 
having extensive experience in dealing 
with formal and informal opposition 
groups – be they from the left or from the 
Islamist currents – it will likely face diffi-
culties in dealing with ideologically hetero-
geneous and leaderless movements. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The Moroccan regime has shown its reluc-
tance to introduce genuine reform unless 
there are internal and external pressures 
that put its interests at stake. If in the 1990s 
the late King was keen on ensuring a peace-
ful monarchical transition and portraying 
an image of a democratizing Morocco, 
recent regional dynamics and societal pres-
sures have put a significant strain on the 
current King to introduce constitutional 
reforms. Yet, the regime has remained 
faithful to its homeopathic manner as well 
as its approach of keeping tight control 
over the reform process, thus preventing 
any structural changes or significant reduc-
tions in the powers of the monarch. 
Yet, if the regime does not deliver, espe-
cially in the social and economic fields, 
gradualism that does not provide for sub-
stantive change might create frustration 
and implant the seeds of social unrest, 
violence and radicalization. Although it is 
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difficult to gauge the degree of satisfaction 
among the general public with regards to 
recent reforms, due to the absence of reli-
able opinion polls, the persistent social 
mobilization around various social, eco-
nomic and political issues shows that the 
expectations are high and that, in the cur-
rent conjuncture, the regime is having a 
difficult time responding to the growing 
list of demands, not least due to the scarcity 
of material resources. 
The only things that will stabilize Moroc-
co in the medium and long term are con-
sistent and profound structural reforms. 
The country could well become a regional 
model for peaceful change if the regime 
alters its approach to change. What is 
needed is a break with a number of en-
trenched political practices, in particular 
the absence of accountability, transparency 
and the dual and ambiguous nature of rul-
ing between the head of the state (the King) 
and the head of government. Here, new 
rules and principles need to be established 
to govern the relations between the mon-
archy, political elites and social forces. 
In this context, competencies should be 
directly linked with accountability. As the 
2011 constitution recognizes this principle 
– which the King has been emphasizing in 
many of his speeches – it should be applied 
to all political actors. If the monarchy 
aspires to be a constitutional one, it should 
be subject to the law and politically ac-
countable. The EU and its member states 
should encourage the monarchy to go 
exactly in that direction. 
Actually, such an approach would com-
plement European-Moroccan relations: 
In 2008 the EU elevated its relations with 
Morocco to an “advanced status,” while the 
kingdom committed itself to an advanced 
and measurable level of political, social and 
economic reforms. So far, this has not trans-
lated into the regime adopting structural 
political reforms aimed at increased ac-
countability and popular participation. Yet, 
European pressure could have an accelerat-
ing effect on Morocco’s reform process. 
More importantly, in a regional context 
characterized by renewed authoritarian 
rule (Egypt) and massive instability, there is 
a concrete danger of Morocco sliding back-
wards, especially in the fields of human 
rights and the rule of law. Europe should 
act so as to prevent Morocco from back-
tracking on reforms already decided upon 
or from abandoning the reform path alto-
gether for the sake of a misled stability. 
The new constitution sets out a list of rights, 
such as the right of access to information, 
the implementation of which will depend 
on laws regulating the procedures to be 
adopted by a Parliament that is largely 
under the control of the monarchy. Thus, 
certain rights run the risk of being diluted 
by such laws. The EU should keep a close 
watch on such developments. It should also 
upgrade its programs for reinforcing the 
capacities of political institutions, such as 
the Parliament and independent political 
parties, and lend more support to empower 
civil society organizations with political 
watchdog functions. 
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